The East in Open Conflict: The Great Strike of 1993 by Turner, Lowell
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
1998 
The East in Open Conflict: The Great Strike of 1993 
Lowell Turner 
Cornell University, lrt4@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the International and Comparative Labor Relations Commons, Labor History Commons, and 
the Unions Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The East in Open Conflict: The Great Strike of 1993 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Because it is impossible in one book to examine all German institutions of negotiation, this book 
focuses on one important set of relations at the heart of social market regulation: the "social partnership" 
between labor and management. "Social partnership," a term widely used throughout the European Union 
but little known in the United States, refers to the nexus—and central political and economic 
importance—of bargaining relationships between strongly organized employers (in employer 
associations) and employees (in unions and works councils) that range from comprehensive collective 
bargaining and plant-level codetermination to vocational training and federal, state, and local economic 
policy discussions. 
To some extent, I use "social partnership" in this book to represent other, parallel processes of regularized 
negotiation throughout the German political economy. From the perspective of economic citizenship and 
democratic participation, however, social partnership itself is the most critical of social market 
mechanisms of negotiation and inclusion. And what is most remarkable, social partnership has not only 
coexisted with but proactively facilitated the strong export-oriented economic performance of the Federal 
Republic of Germany ever since its founding in 1949. 
Keywords 
social partnership, Germany, political economy, employee associations, labor unions 
Disciplines 
International and Comparative Labor Relations | Labor History | Labor Relations | Unions 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Turner, L. (1998). The East in open conflict: The Great Strike of 1993 [Electronic version]. Fighting for 
partnership: Labor and politics in unified Germany (pp. 1-16). Ithaca, NY: ILR Press/Cornell University 
Press. 
Required Publisher’s Statement 
© Cornell University. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/727 
PROLOGUE 
The East in Open Conflict: 
The Great Strike of 1993 
When on November 9 and 10, 1989, hundreds of young Germans danced 
atop the massive and once impenetrable Berlin Wall, the world was forever 
transformed. The collapse of communism, the changes in eastern and central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the agonizing efforts to construct a 
"new world order" have become defining political dramas of our era. At the 
center of these events stands a most remarkable and significant story: the peace-
ful and largely successful unification of the two postwar Germanys. 
Countless books and articles have been written describing the collapse of 
communism in East Germany and chronicling the events leading up to formal 
German unification on October 3, 1990. Other writings emphasize the pro-
tracted difficulties and continuing conflicts and tensions (especially between 
easterners and westerners) in unified Germany in the 1990s. This book aims to 
round out the story by demonstrating that despite all the problems, the unifica-
tion of Germany has been on the whole a rather remarkable success. 
In a nutshell, German unification succeeded thanks to inclusive institutions 
and processes of jiegotiated adjustment. As a "social market'^economy, WesF 
Germany maintained a dense web of regularized negotiations that shaped do-
mestirp5Jltcy in areas ranging from macroeconomic policy, to intergovernmental 
^fid^rrdasTfy^ahE relations, to vocational training and company-level cocTeter-
mination. When East and West Germany were unified on the one-sided basis of 
West German law and practice, West German institutions of negotiation were 
transferred wholesale to the East.Tlmough fraught with difficulties and short-
comings, institutional transfer provided a new and surprisingly flexible frame-
work for the transformation of economy and society in eastern Germany, and 
for the successful unification of modern Germany. 
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Because it is impossible in one book to examine all German institutions of nego-
tiation, this book focuses on one important set of relations at the heart of social 
market regulation: the "social partnership" between labor and management. "So-
cial partnership," a term widely used throughout the European Union but little 
known in the United States, refers to the nexus—and central political and eco-
nomic importance—of bargaining relationships between strongly organized em-
ployers (in employer associations) and employees (in unions and works councils) that 
range from comprehensive collective bargaining and plant-level codetermination to 
vocational training and federal, state, and local economic policy discussions. 
To some extent, I use "social partnership" in this book to represent other, par-
allel processes of regularized negotiation throughout the German political econ-
omy. From the perspective of economic citizenship and democratic participa-
tion, however, social partnership itself is the most critical of social market 
mechanisms of negotiation and inclusion. And what is most remarkable, social 
partnership has not only coexisted with but proactively facilitated the strong ex-
port-oriented economic performance of the Federal Republic of Germany ever 
since its founding in 1949. 
BACKGROUND TO THE STRUGGLE 
With the demise of communist trade unions in East Germany in 1990 and the 
subsequent collapse of the eastern economy in 1990-91, prospects for a western-
style social partnership in the East appeared highly problematic. Many observers 
predicted that market liberalization in the East would bring the beginning of the 
end for strong labor unions, and hence social partnership, in unified Germany. 
In a race to fill the vacuum of collapse, the sixteen unions of the western Ger-
man Labor Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, or DGB) moved rapidly into 
eastern Germany to sign up new members and establish a presence in the eastern 
workplace. At the same time, western investors, employers, and employer associ-
ations moved rapidly into eastern Germany to establish ownership and influence. 
It was not long, of course, before these representatives of management and labor 
were face to face as each sought to secure influence in the new federal states. 
Would the employer associations and the unions establish a strong presence, 
respecting each other's influence in western-style relations of social partnership? 
Or in the fluid and highly uncertain new situation would conflict break out, 
leading to predominantly conflictual relations in the East and perhaps even to a 
breakup of the social partnership back in the West, and in Germany as a whole? 
Would the unification of Germany result in an extension and expansion of 
strong interest representation and social partnership, or would it mean the be-
ginning of the end for these institutions and practices? 
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The first great watershed for German social partnership in the post-unification 
era came in the spring of 1993, when employers in the metal industries of east-
ern Germany unilaterally refused to honor a previously negotiated collective 
agreement to raise workers' pay 26 percent. In a high-stakes effort to beat back 
the employer offensive, IG Metall (the German metalworkers' union) responded 
by calling eastern workers out on strike. The ensuing conflict and its outcome 
were to have major consequences for the future political economy of the East.1 
The opponents in this confrontation were Gesamtmetall, the powerful em-
ployer association that encompasses a range of metal industries including auto-
mobile assembly and parts, machinery-building, shipbuilding, and electronics, 
and IG Metall, the equally powerful industrial union that represents the work-
forces, both blue and white collar, in each of these same industries. Throughout 
the postwar period in West Germany, collective bargaining agreements between 
Gesamtmetall and IG Metall (signed at regional levels but coordinated nation-
ally) have both covered these industries comprehensively and set the pattern for 
negotiations in other sectors of German industry. 
In 1990-91, Gesamtmetall and IG Metall each established a prominent pres-
ence in the new states of eastern Germany. Eastern employees joined IG Metall in 
large numbers, driving total membership in that union up from 2.6 to 3.6 million 
in the space of a year. Conscious of their pattern-setting role and eager to consoli-
date and stabilize western-style labor-management relations in the East, Gesamt-
metall and IG Metall soon entered into negotiations and in March of 1991 signed 
similar three-year contracts for each region of eastern Germany, establishing basic 
pay levels and terms of employment for the metal and electronics industries. 
These contracts provided for the phasing in, for eastern blue- and white-collar 
workers, of nominal wage parity with western workers over a three-year period 
(from 65 percent on April 1, 1991, to 100 percent on April 1, 1994; Bispinck 
1993b, 470). Widely praised at the time, this arrangement offered eastern work-
ers hope (above all to keep them from moving to the already crowded western 
labor market), promoted social stability in a precarious economic situation, and 
enabled employers and investors, who stood to gain by getting in early while 
wage costs remained low, to plan the rebuilding of the East in a rational man-
ner—and at the same time protected western workers and employers from low-
wage competition in the East. 
The cozy relationships of early 1991, however, had evaporated by 1992 in the 
face of economic collapse in eastern Germany.2 Although the pay raise of April 
1, 1992, was paid on schedule, many employers, especially small-to-medium-
sized ones, complained that the continuing phase-in of nominal wage parity 
would ruin them economically. Gesamtmetall knew that if it did not make a 
stand on this issue, its membership density in the East would suffer, since many 
firms would seek to go it alone in hopes of working out a better deal with their 
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own threatened workforces (Silvia 1993, 22; Wever 1995).3 Employer criticism fo-
cused increasingly on the scheduled 26 percent pay raise due on April 1, 1993. 
After failed attempts at renegotiation and arbitration in the winter of 1992-93, 
Gesamtmetall seized the opportunity to "play hardball" in what looked like a sure-
win situation in the spring of 1993. A hard-line view came to dominate within the 
employers' camp: with 40 percent real unemployment and massive job insecurity 
in the East, with no recent history of western-style collective bargaining or labor 
conflict, and with membership in IG Metall quite new and untested for eastern 
workers, mass mobilization and a successful strike in the East looked unlikely. 
The employers announced their intention to cancel the contracts and proceed 
unilaterally with a g percent raise on April 1, instead of the scheduled 26 per-
cent. IG Metall denounced the employer action as illegal and without precedent 
in the postwar period and filed a formal complaint with the labor court (not 
scheduled to be heard until May 14; Bispinck 1993b, 475-76). In the meantime, 
the union announced warning strikes, marches, and demonstrations beginning 
on April 1, to escalate toward a full-fledged strike throughout the metal indus-
tries of eastern Germany if no settlement were reached. 
Employers denounced IG Metall as intransigent and out of touch with its 
membership in a desperate economic situation; the union accused the employers 
of breaking the postwar social contract and undermining the foundations of free 
collective bargaining.4 Employers, backed by the business press and the broader 
employer community—through the Federation of German Employers (BDA) 
and the Federation of German Industry (BDI)—appeared unusually confident 
of victory. Eastern metalworking employees, for their part, obviously felt be-
trayed by the unilateral reduction of their scheduled pay increases; yet according 
to numerous journalistic accounts, they were also wary about going out on strike 
in a period of massive layoffs and economic crisis. Union representatives spoke 
militantly in public of the need to defend collective bargaining and free trade 
unionism but more hesitantly in private of their uncertainty regarding the via-
bility of a strike in eastern Germany. 
Press editorials called for reason on both sides, especially exhorting IG Metall 
to avoid leading its new eastern members into a labor-market disaster. In a front-
page editorial cartoon, Handelsblatt, Germany's leading business daily, showed 
IG Metall president Franz Steinkuhler sitting at the helm of a small boat, steer-
ing his eastern members over the crest of a great waterfall.5 The Economist titled 
its article on the coming conflict "Mass Suicide."6 
Although Gesamtmetall had signed a three-year contract in 1991, the temptation 
offered by mass unemployment proved impossible to resist. This was, after all, an 
employer's dream labor conflict: the new federal states were suffering 40 percent 
real unemployment (producing massive insecurity on the part of remaining job-
holders); the need to hold down costs to preserve jobs was real and desperate; and 
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the relationship between the (western) unions and their (eastern) members was new 
and untested. This was the ideal opportunity to show eastern employers (members 
and potential members of the employer associations) that Gesamtmetall could pro-
vide its constituents firm-level support during a labor conflict; a solid and aggressive 
united front against the powerful IG Metall; reduced labor costs and new wage flex-
ibility as a bargaining outcome; and either a favorably reconfigured social partner-
ship or a broader deregulation for unified Germany, with employers in the driver's 
seat at last. The stakes were high, but the prospects for victory bright. 
APRIL WARNING STRIKES: A PARTICIPANT-OBSERVER'S V I E W 
On March 31, the day before the first scheduled warning strikes, I was sitting in 
the headquarters of the employer association in Berlin, listening to the explana-
tions and predictions of a high-level employer spokesman.7 According to him, 
and as other employers had explained in interviews in the preceding days, 
Gesamtmetall's hard line on contract cancellation and the unilaterally imposed 9 
percent pay.raise were necessary to rescue the eastern economy. Furthermore, IG 
Metall would come to its senses once it became apparent that easterners had no 
stomach for a real strike. Yes, there might be a few face-saving warning strikes, 
but no^one coulcl really believe either that eastern workers would vote to strike 
(with a 75 percent vote in favor required to authorize a strike) or that if they did, 
that they could hold out in a protracted conflict. From the employers' vantage 
point, this was the eve of a new era in which their own position would be consol-
idated in eastern Germany at the expense of IG Metall bargaining power. Al-
though concerned about the imminent labor conflict, this employer spokesman 
was at the same time slightly flushed with the anticipation of a major victory.8 
On the telephone that evening, I asked Manfred Muster, chairman of IG 
Metall for the city-state of Bremen in western Germany, what hope the union 
could have in such a desperate situation. Victory was widely predicted for the 
employers, who indeed seemed eager to push the union into a losing battle. 
"I don't know what will happen," he replied. "We don't know if our eastern 
colleagues will strike. This is unknown territory, you know. We are in a position 
now where we have to fight, even if we may lose." 
"What fall-back strategy is there if the strike doesn't work out? What compro-
mise could the union accept?" 
"The employers have broken the contract. We are willing to negotiate, but the 
employers must take back their contract cancellation and reinstate the principle 
of phased-in wage parity. Otherwise, collective bargaining is dead in Germany." 
"But what if the easterners won't strike? So many of them have become disil-
lusioned with IG Metall and other western unions for being unable to stop mass 
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layoffs over the past two years. Will they follow you now? The papers say you are 
leading them into disaster." 
"Listen, I don't know what will happen. I only know that we have our backs to 
the wall now and have to fight. Rostock is Bremen's sister city in the East, and to-
morrow I go there to help organize the warning strikes. If you want to see for 
yourself what happens, meet me in Rostock." 
And so at 6 A.M. on the morning of April 2,1 found myself in an industrial district 
of Rostock, with a small group of IG Metall members and works councillors, shiv-
ering in the dark and cold outside a Siemens electronics plant. This group's job was 
to leaflet the morning shift at Siemens and other adjacent companies, to make sure 
that everyone knew about the warning strike scheduled for 11 A.M. Since this was a 
Friday, the plan was for everyone to walk off the job, march downtown for a rally at 
the shipyards, and then take the rest of the weekend off. The purpose of the warn-
ing strike was to demonstrate collective anger at the employers' cancellation of the 
three-year contract with its scheduled 26 percent April 1 pay raise; show worker sol-
idarity with union demands; and give the employers a foretaste of the readiness of 
eastern workers to go out on strike. A strong showing would bolster the union posi-
tion heading into a full-fledged strike, as well as increase the likelihood of a favorable 
settlement. A weak showing would cut the ground from under the union position. 
Siemens seemed an unlikely place to produce a large strike turnout. In the 
first place, Siemens is an electronics firm, the least union-friendly sector that IG 
Metall organizes. At this particular plant, restructuring since unification (includ-
ing the plant's purchase by Siemens) had meant a drop in workforce size from 
over 2,000 to around 600: the remaining employees were hardly likely to feel 
very secure about their individual job prospects. Finally, the "plant" here con-
sisted mainly of a long, eight-story office building, occupied largely by white-
collar workers, including many professional and technical employees and women, 
hardly the groups considered most highly organizable in traditional (and con-
temporary) western industrial relations. 
My companions (two men and three women, all except Manfred easterners 
and members of Rostock IG Metall) handed out leaflets and talked with incom-
ing employees. Most people were polite about taking leaflets and seemed gen-
uinely interested in talking about the pros and cons of a warning strike—and 
would even stand out in the cold air for a few minutes to do so. 
At one point, a Siemens manager (like almost everyone else at this plant an 
easterner) burst out of the lobby, demanding to know what these folks were 
doing there, urging his people to walk off the job. 
"We are organizing a warning strike!" proclaimed Manfred. "This is our right 
under Article 9 of the Constitution." 
The manager turned away and reentered the building. Manfred's eyes 
sparkled. "We are Germans," he said with a wink. "You have to tell them it's 
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legal. In Italy or France it wouldn't make any difference whether it was legal or 
not, but here it matters." 
"What does Article 9 say about warning strikes?" I asked. 
"Freedom of association. We use it all the time. He will probably go look it up. 
There won't be anything in there about warning strikes, but it should keep him quiet." 
The manager never reappeared. Incoming employees continued to take leafl-
ets and talk at length with the IG Metallers. The sun finally came up and warmed 
the air a bit. When the morning shift was in and two adjacent companies had 
been leafleted as well, we drove back to union headquarters for breakfast. Rudi-
ger Klein, an easterner and head of the Rostock IG Metall, reviewed their plans 
for the day. With a stack of paperwork a foot high—member applications for var-
ious benefits, especially those related to unemployment—he never stopped exam-
ining and signing documents as he and his colleagues talked tactics and strategy. 
At 10:00 A.M., the union office emptied out as groups headed off in different 
directions for various workplaces around Rostock. Back at the Siemens plant, 
the head of the works council, clearly concerned, met us with the news that top 
managers had gone through the offices, threatening employees with "dire conse-
quences" if they joined the warning strike. 
Manfred jumped into the IG Metall van and drove around to the side of the 
building. He turned on the loudspeaker. "This is IG Metall speaking," he said. 
"Today we are going out on a warning strike. 11:00 A.M. This is our right under 
Article 9 of the Constitution." 
I looked up to see faces appearing from behind the curtains, windows opening 
on all floors. "The employers have illegally canceled the contract. You were sup-
posed to get a 26 percent raise yesterday; instead you got 9 percent. This is a his-
toric moment when we get to decide whether to accept such demeaning treatment 
or whether to fight back. The warning strike is the first step in standing up for what 
is rightfully yours. Without this step, no further steps are possible. If we let the em-
ployers walk over us now, there will be no stopping them. Colleagues, you have the 
legal right to join the warning strike, and we all have the duty to do so if we value 
collective bargaining and free trade unions in the Federal Republic of Germany." 
Manfred paused for air and then continued. More faces appeared at the win-
dows. "It doesn't matter if some boss runs through the building telling you not to 
join us. You won't defend your rights behind the curtains. You won't get a 26 
percent pay raise by sitting at your desk today. Our peace obligation expired yes-
terday when the employers canceled the contract. Our warning strike rights are 
protected under the law. Come join us, colleagues, come join us!" 
Manfred drove around to the other side of the building and repeated his ex-
hortation, loudspeaker blaring. Again, heads appeared in the windows. But what 
weight could Manfred's words carry against the real threat of job loss? Could 
this be any more than Don Quixote against the windmills? 
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At 10:45, m e l a w n m front of the building was still empty except for a few anx-
ious works councillors. At 10:50, two or three warning strikers (or just curious 
onlookers?) appeared. Manfred drove back and forth, from one end of the build-
ing to the other, escalating the intensity of his exhortations. At 10:55, a ^ e w m o r e 
emerged, a small handful for what looked like a very lonely march into town. 
And then something quite surprising happened. At 11:00 A.M., as punctual as 
the German trains, the white- and blue-collar employees of Siemens streamed 
out through the main door. There were twenty, then fifty, then a hundred, two 
hundred, and still the numbers grew. As the sidewalks overflowed on to the lawn, 
what was happening came suddenly into focus: these workers, despite the threats 
and uncertainty, and at great personal risk had in fact stood up for what they be-
lieved was right and shut their company down. 
The crowd appeared quite uncertain about what it was doing. People tensed 
up noticeably as two police cars sped around the corner and pulled up next to 
the IG Metall van. Manfred flipped the loudspeaker on again and declared: "We 
greet the colleagues from the police department who have arrived to join the 
warning strike and escort us into town." People cheered, the police shrugged 
and waved back, and a squad car moved forward to clear traffic for the march. 
Manfred spun the van around and eased down the street, followed by a long line 
of warning strikers turned marchers, now several hundred strong. 
Along the route, small crowds from several other workplaces waited to join 
the march. The sun blazed down on a cool but beautiful April day. An IG Met-
all youth group joined at the front of the march with a wide red banner calling 
for wage solidarity East and West. Spirits rose as the numbers grew, and by the 
time the columns passed under an elevated subway station and swung into the 
main corridor to the shipyards, there were a good one thousand marchers. At 
the approach to the square in front of the shipyards, our march was joined by an 
equally large group from another part of town. Columns approached from other 
directions, the workers had already spilled out from the shipyards, and there they 
were, about five thousand eastern workers (according to union and press reports) 
milling around in the crisp sunshine in front of a lashed-together stage, partici-
pating together in this history-making event: the first legally sanctioned collec-
tive bargaining work stoppage in eastern Germany since 1933. 
TV cameras rolled as union leaders (Frank Teichmuller, head of IG Metall for 
the northern coastal region, Rtidi Klein of Rostock, and Manfred Muster from 
Bremen) gave speeches. The crowd roared at the announcement that twenty-
thousand warning strikers in greater Rostock had shut down the metal, ship-
building, and electronics industries of the area until Monday.9 
In the aftermath, at a press conference in the shipyards, back at the union 
office, and later that evening over Rostocker beer in a smoke-filled tavern, these 
union leaders were quietly ecstatic. Although they recounted over and over the 
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potential dangers ahead, they knew now that they had more support behind 
them than they had dreamed of. From that day on, the employers knew it too. 
The Rostock story was repeated in successful warning strikes all over eastern 
Germany on April i arid 2. From then on, for the next six weeks, this first great 
eastern labor conflict since German unification, and the first major collective 
bargaining conflict in eastern Germany since the Weimar Republic—which 
Hider had eliminated sixty years earlier along with free trade unions, codetermi-
nation, and collective bargaining—became a test of will and staying power. 
T H E M A Y STRIKE 
Successful warning strikes throughout the new German states April 1-2 and 
again April 14-15 shattered western preconceptions of eastern worker passivity. 
Even Michael Fichter, an astute, Berlin-based observer of eastern German indus-
trial relations since 1989, had referred to "the widespread instance of lethargy and 
passive expectation . . . after years of being watched over, taken care of, and hav-
ing favors and social improvements—when forthcoming—doled out to them, East 
Germans seem to be particularly prone to such behavior" (Fichter 1991, 35).10 
For Gesamtmetall, the comfortable illusion that easterners, after sixty com-
bined years of Nazism and command communism, would no longer stand up 
for their own interests when forcefully challenged vanished. For IG Metall, the 
demonstrative shattering of this same troubling preconception cast new light on 
the union's bargaining position in eastern Germany. 
For a few days, an early settlement looked possible. Kurt Biedenkopf, prime min-
ister of Saxony, offered his services as a mediator, leading to discussions between IG 
Metall and the employer association (VSME in Saxony) on April 4 and 5. An agree-
ment was reached between the two sides, reinstating the scheduled April 1 pay raise 
but extending the timetable for full parity by one additional year. IG Metall head-
quarters in Frankfurt indicated its willingness to accept the compromise; Gesamt-
metall headquarters in Cologne, however, turned it down, forcing the Saxon em-
ployer association chairman to resign his position. IG Metall pointed to this failed 
effort at compromise as evidence of GesamtmetalTs unreasonableness.11 
Rumors of further behind-the-scenes discussions and possible compromise so-
lutions circulated throughout the month of April and into May.12 Publicly, how-
ever, both sides hardened their positions. After the second round of warning 
strikes on April 14-15, the first strike votes were scheduled for late April. Demon-
strations of support for the eastern metalworkers organized by the DGB drew 
about 200,000 participants in both eastern and western Germany on April 24 
and 25. The first strike votes, held April 26-28, yielded votes of 85 percent in 
favor in Saxony (the southern part of eastern Germany) and 90 percent in favor 
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in Mecklenburg-Pomerania (the northern part, including Rostock). A parallel 
vote in the eastern steel industry, also organized by IG Metall but negotiating 
separately, yielded a vote of 86 percent in favor (Bispinck 1993b, 477). 
The strike began in Saxony on May 3, with 7,000 workers at twenty work-
places, and in Mecklenburg-Pomerania on May 4, with 12,500 workers from 
twenty-four workplaces. The union raised the numbers gradually, so that by the 
second week, 30,000 workers from seventy-five workplaces had joined the strike 
(Bispinck 1993b, 477). Solidarity among the strikers, who received an average of 
D M 220-250 (about $150) per week in strike benefits from the union, appeared 
strong.13 There were no signs at all of what the employers had expected: an early 
return to work by dispirited eastern workers. 
On May 10-12, IG Metall escalated the stakes by holding strike votes in the 
remaining regions of eastern Germany, which produced votes of 81 percent in 
favor in Berlin-Brandenburg, 86 percent in favor in Saxony-Anhalt, and 85 per-
cent in favor in Thuringia (Bispinck 1993b, 477). On May 12, 400,000 workers 
and their supporters demonstrated throughout Germany in support of the strik-
ers, including over 50,000 western workers who briefly laid down their tools in 
solidarity.14 On May 13, the IG Metall national executive board announced its 
decision to spread the strike to all of eastern Germany. By the end of the second 
week (May 14), 50,000 eastern metalworkers were on strike.15 
Intensive negotiations resumed in Saxony, again with the mediation of Kurt 
Biedenkopf, finally yielding a settlement on May 14. The terms of this agree-
ment served as a closely followed pattern for the other regions of eastern Ger-
many and the steel industry as well. TJiejparties agreed to the principle of 
phased-in wage parity for eastern workers but established a new timetable. In a 
symbolic but important gesture for the union, the 26 percent raise was reinstated 
retroactively to April 1. Effective April 16, the raise was dropped to 9 percent 
(plus anything else that individual firms had agreed to), then raised again in 
June, September, and December, so that the 26 percent level was reached by the 
end of the year. Further raises in 1994—96 were scheduled to bring wage parity 
between East and West by July 1, 1996. The employers issued a statement con-
ceding that the extraordinary contract cancellation, used in this case only, was 
not an appropriate solution to collective bargaining problems.16 
The u m o n j ^ s ^ e c u r e d its main demands; a reinstatement of the 26 percent 
pay increase, an admission by the employers that the contract cancellation was 
inappropriate and could set no precedent for future labor conflicts, and a de-
fense of phased-in wage parity for eastern workers. In addition, the union re-
sisted the introduction of an "opening clause, " which would allow easy down-
ward wage adjustment at specific firms (see below). Most important, perhaps, 
the union discovered in its new eastern membership a highly mobilizable force 
capable of conflict, solidarity, and personal sacrifice. 
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Employers secured considerable total labor cost savings for the period 
1993-96 during the lengthened phase-in of wage parity.17 In addition, Gesamt-
metall was able to demonstrate a new bargaining aggressiveness on behalf of its 
members as well as to provide support services during a strike, to help convince 
skeptical eastern employers to join or remain in the association. But the employ-
ers, in the end, were forced to give in to the central union demands, including 
the concept of phased-in eastern wage parity; and they were forced to back 
down in the face of unexpectedly determined employee militancy. 
Instead of an opening clause, Gesamtmetall settled for a new "hardship 
clause." While both allow for downward wage adjustment at designated firms, 
the distinction is critical. An opening clause puts the power to negotiate lower 
wage levels in the hand of firms and their works councils. In a period of eco-
nomic crisis and mass unemployment, works councils would find themselves 
under great pressure to make substantial concessions. A hardship clause, on the 
other hand, puts the power of approval in the hands of a union-employer com-
mission, effectively giving IG Metall the power to veto any attempt by an employer 
to defect from a settlement.18 While the employers heralded this as a break-
through in the direction of greater wage flexibility, the union vowed to use the 
new instrument selectively, to monitor and control carefully all temporary ad-
justments—a promise IG Metall has kept. 
Striking workers clearly viewed the settlement as a victory. With only a 25 per-
cent favorable vote required for ratification, yes votes totaled 78 percent in Saxony; 
a similar 61 percent in Mecklenburg-Pomerania, Thuringia, and Saxony-Anhalt; 
46 percent in Berlin-Brandenburg; and 78 percent for the eastern steel industry.19 
EXPLAINING THE UNEXPECTED 
Why did the employers provoke this labor conflict, which even they (at least 
off the record) admit that they lost? Why were they willing to gamble with the es-
tablished system of social partnership, one that had worked so well for them for 
so long? The employer view, supported by many economists, was that economic 
collapse in the East had forced them into this strategy, given the uncompromis-
ing attitude of IG Metall. The survival of individual companies, especially the 
small and medium-sized, as well as the growth of the eastern German economy, 
required lower labor costs. 
In itself, this argument rests on shaky foundations. As in the West, large firms 
typically dominate the employer associations in the East, and this is certainly 
true for Gesamtmetall. Most large firms in the East were owned either by west-
ern companies or the Treuhand (the government-established trust agency for in-
dustries formerly owned by the East German state, discussed further in Chapter 
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2) and had downsized drastically in the preceding years, thus substantially re-
ducing the impact of any scheduled pay raise (medium-sized firms had also 
downsized drastically). Numerous large firms made this clear by promising their 
own works councils a premium over the imposed 9 percent April 1 raise; large 
firms in fact typically told works councils that they would like to pay the 26 per-
cent but could not break ranks with the employer association and would match 
or exceed the final bargained settlement. As for the broader economic crisis and 
future development in the East, wage levels were hardly the dominant problem. 
Outstanding property claims, a weak infrastructure, and general economic un-
certainty inhibited western investment in the East, even as unit labor costs 
dropped. With mass layoffs and the introduction of western production tech-
niques, unit labor costs in eastern Germany, despite bargained wage raises, were 
on a rapid downward curve (Bispinck 1993a, 324-25). 
A more plausible and complete explanation for the employer strategy high-
lights two factors. First, Gesamtmetall had not yet consolidated itself organiza-
tionally in the East, where membership levels remained considerably lower than 
in the West (Wiesenthal, Ettl, and Bialas 1992; Silvia 1993, 3, 22). Above all, it 
was the small and medium-sized firms who were not joining in the East, which 
not only undermined the association's membership base but also threatened its 
long-term finances and influence. Thus Gesamtmetall was more vulnerable to 
the demands of these firms than in the West, where companies had long experi-
ence with the benefits of membership, especially in the event of a strike. 
Gesamtmetall therefore needed to show that it could be forceful, and wage re-
straint and downward wage flexibility were the handiest issues to be forceful 
about. And perhaps the association even welcomed a widespread strike as an op-
portunity to demonstrate to eastern firms the benefits of membership (including 
valuable financial and legal support for potentially isolated firms in the event of 
a strike). In addition, the chances of not only winning such a strike but strength-
ening permanently the position of German employers within or even beyond 
the social partnership seemed excellent. Given massive unemployment and near 
desperate job insecurity on the part of eastern workers, the temptation to go for 
a major win must have been irresistible.20 
Neither of these conditions alone would have been sufficient to drive employ-
ers to their rather drastic course of action, the first midterm contract cancella-
tion in the history of collective bargaining in the Federal Republic. Both condi-
tions—labor market circumstances (massive unemployment) and institutional 
preservation (the need to expand and consolidate membership in eastern Ger-
many)—appear necessary to explain the employer choice of strategy. 
Why did IG Metall prove willing to strike against what even many unionists 
considered impossible odds? Newspaper editorials and employer and govern-
ment rhetoric implied that the union's only interest was in its own power and the 
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pay levels of its employed members. They accused the union of demonstrating a 
reckless disregard for the future of the eastern economy and catering only to the 
short-term interests of an eastern audience while defending the long-term inter-
ests of established western members (whose job security and pay levels could be 
undermined by lower wages in the East). 
If this had been the case, however, the appropriate strategy would have been 
to find a face-saving compromise with employers, to avoid a possibly losing strike 
which would have had major negative repercussions in both the East and the 
West. A better explanation for what many saw as a counterintuitive (not to men-
tion counterproductive) union strategy again highlights institutional preserva-
tion. IG Metall saw the contract cancellation as a possibly precedent-setting 
threat to the very rules and framework under which it had built up its influence 
in the German political economy. In choosing to strike, the union recognized 
that its own position in society was jeopardized if it failed to defend its institu-
tional underpinnings, including collective bargaining and the binding nature of 
signed contracts. Even more important, the union was defending itself as an or-
ganization. In the wake of mass layoffs, there were already clear signs of eastern 
disillusionment with the promises of western-style unionism. If IG Metall had 
not been willing to fight to defend its contract and the principle of phased-in 
wage parity, a major hemorrhaging of eastern membership could have been ex-
pected. And if employers could go non-union (or weak-union) in the East, there 
was no reason to think they would not later move toward such an "Americaniza-
tion" of industrial relations (as Germans put it) in the West. 
The stakes were therefore high enough for the union to make gambling on a 
high-risk strategy worthwhile; institutional preservation was important enough to 
risk major defeat, which seemed quite likely at the time. In a way, the union needed 
a major strike in the East, just as the employers did, to demonstrate its commitment 
to the interests of its new eastern members and to mobilize eastern members be-
hind a commitment to popular union demands. Even in defeat, such a mobilization 
could integrate eastern workers and forge an identity for them as union members in 
a way that no other activity could. And since unionized works councillors could be 
expected to play leading roles in organizing strike preparations at the plants, a strike 
could have the added benefit of solidifying union commitment on the works coun-
cils, drawing these important bodies more fully into the union orbit.21 
And where did the eastern workers find such unexpected resolve and readi-
ness for conflict? Why did they choose to go out on strike in large numbers in a 
high-risk situation? Their interest in higher pay was clearly an important factor. 
Expectations had risen dramatically after unification; and although living costs 
had risen rapidly toward western levels, income had not. For similar work, east-
erners were paid far less than western workers, and the 26 percent raise sched-
uled for April 1 was seen as a major step in the long-term move toward parity. 
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Wage interests alone, however, are clearly not sufficient to explain this high-risk 
choice. Periods of mass unemployment are typically times when union and 
worker bargaining power is low and the strike threat is least credible; at such 
times, worker militancy is typically restrained, despite interest in higher pay (Fla-
herty 1983; Katz and Kochan 1992, 222, 232). 
There are, therefore, two other necessary parts to the explanation for eastern 
militancy Worker mobilization in this case was fueled by extraordinary passion, a 
product of the combined frustrations and disillusionment that German unification 
had produced for eastern Germans.22 In the rush to unification and the political 
campaigns of 1990, easterners had been promised prosperity to go along with 
their newfound freedoms? Instead, they found themselves plunged into an eco-
nomic crisis complete with mass unemployment, rising prices, and great job inse-
curity and dispossessed by an invasion of western employers and government offi-
cials. For easterners in the metal industries, the unilateral employer cancellation of 
the scheduled pay raise was the straw that broke the camel's back. The bitterness 
and rage of what was in some ways a colonized people (Weiss 1991; Knuth 1993; 
Baylis 1993, 87) was channeled into this strike, much to the benefit of IG Metall. 
The final necessary condition to explain eastern mobilization was the existence 
of a framework 01 credible institutions into which the passion could be funneled, 
with reasonable prospects of success. These institutions were largely imported 
from the West: codetermination based on elected works councillors who could, in 
their capacity as union members, provide strike leadership, and a system of com-
prehensive regional collective bargaining, which included the participation of a 
powerful, conflict-testecl metalworkers union. The presence of these proven insti-
tutions, and the reassuring words of IG Metall that strikes were appropriate, legal, 
and winnable, provided the structure necessary for easterners to channel their pas-
sion into appropriate action (as opposed to either passive disillusionment and with-
drawal or inappropriate action such as attacks on foreigners or other scapegoats). 
Still unanswered, however, is the question, why did IG Metall and its eastern 
membership win? The employers were certainly quite sure, for good reason, that 
they and not the union or workers would win. The analyses of perceptive acade-
mics such as Mahnkopf (1991, 1993) and Armingeon (1991) pointed clearly toward 
declining union influence in unified Germany. If this were the case, it would 
hardly lead one to expect a major IG Metall victory in eastern Germany in 1993. 
Underestimated in such analyses, however, were two important factors: the pas-
sion and potential militancy of eastern workers; and the resilience and adaptabil-
ity of the institutions of industrial relations in the Federal Republic, in particular 
codetermination and the system of comprehensive collective bargaining. 
Under adverse circumstances,%IG Metall won this strike because.(1).it made the 
strategic and rather risky decision to strike, at a time when the most prudent 
course of action might have been some face-saving compromise; (2) eastern work-
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ers in large numbers made the courageous decision to risk future employment 
grospects for an issue in which they deeply believed (phased-in wage parity); and 
(3) western institutions of industrial relations, transplanted and adapted to condi-
tions in the East, afforded a viable framework in which the strike could be fought 
arid won. Codetermination law meant that most works councillors had received 
urilon training and thus provided a union base in most plants; comprehensive col-
lective bargaining made it possible to mobilize widespread solidarity. 
Not only was a union victory far from inevitable, the evidence suggests that a 
union victory would have been exceedingly difficult in the absence of any one of 
these three conditions. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
For IG Metall, successful mobilization of the eastern membership provided a 
much needed boost to union fortunes in the new federal states of eastern Ger-
many. Precisely when generalized eastern disillusionment was broadening out to 
include the incoming western unions that so many had joined with high expecta-
tions but which had proven incapable of preventing mass unemployment, the 
strike solidified union commitment, at least in the pattern-setting metal indus-
tries. Here, at least, was an organization that would fight for eastern interests; 
here, at least, was a set of institutions that could offer some leverage for those in-
terests. For many eastern workers, in fact, this strike may well prove to have been 
a formative experience. In the first major collective bargaining conflict in eastern 
Germany in sixty years, workers discovered that they could mobilize and defend 
their interests successfully. IG Metall became the beneficiary of this mobilization, 
in the organizational commitment both of eastern members, especially activists, 
and the works councils. Mobilizing works councils into bases of union support 
may have been the most important single effect of this strike for the union. 
For Gesamtmetall, the hard-line strategy and effective dominance in the East 
that employers had sought was no longer viable, at least in the short run. But there 
was consolation in defeat for the employers. Because they were willing to provoke 
and sustain a strike, they did secure considerable labor cost savings over a three-
year period. The hardship clause afforded a limited opening for downward wage 
adjustment. Most importandy, however, Gesamtmetall showed its members and 
potential members in the East that it would stand up to the union, fight for em-
ployer interests, and provide useful services in the event of a labor dispute. 
What did the strike and settlement mean for the eastern economy? This is 
harder to gauge. Employers claimed, as a rule, that they could sustain the costs of 
phased-in wage parity, especially with the time period deferred. Union sources 
have presented persuasive data to indicate that labor costs were not the primary 
J5 
PROLOGUE 
cause of economic problems in the East (Bispinck 1993b, 472-74). The new con-
tract brought stability to employer planning and investment strategies in eastern 
Germany, since in the wake of the settlement firms could now plan labor costs 
several years in advance. The consolidation of the principle of phased-in wage 
parity weakened the prospects for an economic and labor-market "polarization 
scenario" between East and West in Germany and strengthened the prospects 
that employers, if they invested, would take a modernizing, high-skills, high-
quality approach to production organization in the East (Jurgens, Klinzing, and 
Turner 1993, 241-43). Whether the dominant reality in the coming years would 
be modernization or deindustrialization still depended on many factors, includ-
ing government policy, economic growth in the West, the settlement of property 
claims, the development of infrastructure, and the opening of new markets in 
central and eastern Europe (as those countries either grow or stagnate). 
For other sectors of the eastern economy, the settlement in the metal indus-
tries set an important pattern. In interviews in eastern Germany in March and 
April of 1993,1 heard time and again from representatives of non-metal sectors 
that they were waiting to see what would happen in the metal industry conflict. 
Union representatives at O T V (the public sector) and DPG (postal and telecom-
munications workers), for example, said that if IG Metall lost the strike, their 
own bargaining partners could be expected to follow a similar hard-line, union-
challenging strategy. For those unions, comprehensive collective bargaining con-
tracts were set to expire within a few months of the metal conflict; as it turned 
out, IG Metall's victory established a pattern around which to negotiate settle-
ments based on the principle of phased-in wage parity. 
The conflict and setdement in the metal industries, in other words, were pattern-
setting events that led to a widespread consolidation throughout the eastern econ-
omy of (1) nominal wage parity for eastern workers in the medium term,23 and 
(2Vwestern-style institutions of industrial relations, including considerable union in-
fluence along withxomprehensive, region- and sector-based collective bargaining. 
Although the crisis of social partnership was far from over, this strike and its 
settlement greatly increased the prospects for continuing social partner-style re-
lations between employers and unions in eastern Germany.24 It is still possible, 
however, that the union victory was a Pyrrhic one.25 Much depends on eco-
nomic and industrial development in eastern Germany as well as the outcome of 
future labor conflicts in both eastern and western Germany. 
For Germany as a whole, however, the strike settlement of 1993 appears to 
have pushed forward the long-term development of a country truly unified, not 
just territorially, but economically, socially, and politically as well. 
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